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This amendment shows removal of feudal theories. The protection
of the landowner was one of the greatest interests in the feudal law.
But in the modem use of the word "landlord" is found no meaning
such as "lord of the land." That it has taken more than a century
to overcome the error of the 1828 legislature is unfortunate. However, this is not the only example of the slow metamorphosis of the
law from the engulfing cocoon of feudalism. The criticism of continuation of the seal as evidence of consideration seems appropriate,
but the failure to remedy Section 259 exemplifies the slow growth
of the law. It is only due to modem business methods and the painstaking care of today's lawyers that more confusion has not arisen.
Indeed New York's Statute of Frauds in reference to land contracts
was more feudal than the English Statute of Frauds enacted in 1677.
This amendment, then, has brought a most important phase of
the law back to a logical basis. But feudalism dies hard, if at all,
and we must await judicial construction of the statute as amended
before it can be said how far this recent step hag gone. The basic
policy of a constitutional democracy should have the liberty, equality,
and rights of man, as its prime consideration with the feudal rights
of property owners secondary to those great inalienable rights.
JOSEPH M. CUNNINGHAM.

NOTICE REQUIRED TO TERMINATE MONTHLY OR MONTH TO
MONTH TENANCIES OUTSIDE THE CITY OF NEW YORK.-Section

232b of the Real Property Law,1 enacted in 1942 and amended by
the Legislature of the State of New York at this session, represents
another step in the direction of statutory standardization of the notice
required to terminate monthly or month to month tenancies. In its
original form this section sounded the death knell for the alleged distinction between monthly and month to month tenancies outside the
City of New York; the proposed modification merely defined the
character of the notice required 2 and reaffirmed the common law.
Unlike tenancies for a fixed period which end on the date provided
for in the agreement, notice is a condition of the contract when the
leasing is for an indefinite term.3 This was formerly subject to

IN. Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 232b: NOTIFICATION TO TERMINATE MONTHLY
TENANCY OR MONTH TO MONTH TENANCY OUTSIDE THE CITY OF NEW YORK. A
monthly tenancy or tenancy from month to month of any lands or buildings
located outside of the city of New York may be terminated by the landlord or
the tenant [upon his notifying] by written iwtice from the one to the other of.
at least one month before the expiration of the term of his election to terminate; provided, however, that no notification shall be necessary to terminate a
tenancy for a definite term. Suci-notice must be served upon the tenant or
the landlord, as the case may be, either personally or by registered mail. The
matter in italics is new; the matter in [brackets] is old law to be omitted.

2 See Report of Law Rev. Comm. (1938) 405-421.
3 Pugsley v. Aikin, 11 N. Y. 494 (1854).
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qualification in4 view of the various irreconcilable decisions rendered
by our courts.
At common law a tenancy from year to year could be terminated
by either the landlord or his lessee in giving to the other six months'
notice before the expiration of the term. This same rule governed
tenancies of a shorter duration except that the notice was generally
equivalent to the letting. In a month to month tenancy a month's
notice was necessary, and similarly a week's notice where the tenant
held from week to week. 6 The method in which tenancies of uncertain duration are created 7 and the decisions construing their
determination accounts for the lack of uniformity within the State
of New York. The distinguishing characteristics under the common
law as evidenced by our decisions with regard to the notice required
to terminate monthly or month to month tenancies are the lack of
definitiveness and certainty. In early New York cases it was held
that a month's notice was required to excise a renting from month
to month, 8 although there are a minority of cases sustaining the
contrary view. 9 Other cases hold that only reasonable notice need
be given 10 and still others argue for thirty days." That notice might
be given within thirty-two days was not bad 12 but when given sixty
days before the expiration of the term it was held to be premature
and invalid. 18 When there was a monthly letting and a holding over
subsequent thereto, no notice was necessary.' 4 Notice to quit given
by the tenant dispenses with any on the part of the landlord. 15 Under
Section 232a of the Real Property Law which is restricted to New
4Adams v. City of Cohoes, 127 N. Y. 184 (1891) ; cf. Hand v. Knaul, 116
Misc. 714, 191 N. Y. Supp. 667 (1921); Mandel v. Koerner, 90 Misc. 9, 152

N. Y. Supp. 847 (1915). Contra: People v. Darling, 47 N. Y. 666 (1872).
5 See WA.nSH, THE LAW 6F REAL PROPERTY (2d ed. 1927) 251.
6 See P. Marcus, Periodic Tenancies (1938) 7 FORDHAAi L. REV. 167;
continued (1939) 8 FORDHAm L. REv. 356.

7See WALSH, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY (2d ed. 1927).
Periodic tenancies are created in the following ways:
1. By express agreement between the parties.
2. By entry and payment of rent under a lease void by the Statute of
Frauds.
3. By holding over after the expiration of a fixed term.

S Kligenstein v. Goldwasser, 58 N. Y. Supp. 342 (1899); Hungerford v.

Wagoner, 39 N. Y. Supp. 369 (1895).

9 People ex rel. Aldhouse v. Goelet, 64 Barb. 476 (N. Y. 1873) ; Park v.
Castle, 19 How. Pr. 29 (N. Y. 1860).
o10See O'Brien v. Clement, 160 N. Y. Supp. 975 (1916). Where parties
specify for reasonable notice without stating the time, it has been held that a
month's notice is reasonable. Cf. Hungerford v. Wagoner, cited su~pra note 8.
11 Ludington v. Garlock, 9 N. Y. Supp. 24 (1890).
12 Moore v. Scullion, 198 N. Y. Supp. 760 (1923).
"3Gill v. Gill, 161 Ill. App. 221 (1911).
14 Hand v. Knaul, 116 Misc. 714, 191 N. Y. Supp. 667 (1921) ; Ludington
v. Garlock, 55 Hun 612, 9 N. Y. Supp. 24 (N. Y. 1890).
15A. N. P. Realty Co. v. Tunick, 115 Misc. 190, 187 N. Y. Supp. 347
(1921).
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York City, the obligation to give notice rests solely on the landlord; 16
outside New York City it is asserted that the duty is reciprocal.1 7 At
common law the notice did not have to be reduced to writing;18 the
statute enacted specifies otherwise. 19
The impetus given to a year to year tenancy as opposed to one
at will was dictated by a sound agrarian policy and especially favored
at common law.2 0 With the era of industrial economy, counterpart
of the year to year tenancy found expression in that of a month to
month letting. New York, however, blazed a new trail fraught with
many hazards. A tenuous line of distinction has been drawn between
monthly and a month to month tenancy.2 1 Authorative definition of
the monthly tenancy in Hand v. Knaul 22 states:
A monthly hiring or tenancy is where the premises are actually or by necessary
implication hired for the single term of one month, and the tenancy automatically expires at the end of each month and is renewed for another month

whenever the tenant holds over into the next month. Such a tenancy requires
no notice for its termination ....
The tenancy from month to month is where
the tenant's term is indefinite and uncertain although the rent is paid monthly
... such a tenancy requires a notice of 30 days for its termination.
When a landlord exercises his right of election in derogation of trespass by a holdover tenant, apart from any express or implied contractual agreement between the parties, the law imposes on the holdover the duty of paying rent at the same terms of the original demise.
The tenancy that results incorporates all the incidents of the former
relationship and its duration is for a fixed period.2a If the holding
over after the expiration of the fixed period without the consent of
the landlord is for but one month and not continuous, then the
doctrine as laid down in Smith v. Littlefield 24 would seem to apply.
This theory is not tenable where there is a continued holding over
with the assent of the landlord.
In the report of the Law Revision Commission 25 recommending
legislative abrogation of this distinction, it is stated in support of
the change that:
The principle on which a monthly tenancy is based is contrary to common
experience, for only in unusual cases do the parties contemplate a tenancy for a
month at a time, each month being a separate term which expires at the end of
16 Ertischek v. Blanco, 173 Misc. 153 (1940).
7 Boyar v. Wallenberg, 132 Misc. 116 (1928),
states: "When there is an
obligation to give notice, other than statutory, it is binding on both parties, their
rights and duties being correlative and reciprocal." See Hand v. Knaul, cited
supra note 14.
18

See P. Marcus, Periodic Tenancies (1938) 7

29
2 0 Cited supra note 1.

HOLDSWoRTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW

21
22
2

Cited supra note 14.

L. Rzv. 186.

(3d ed. 1923) 243.

See Report, Law Rev. Comn. (1938) 379-383.

supra note 7, at 258-260.
51 N. Y. 539, 542 (1873).
25 Report, Law Rev. Comm. (1938) 379-380.
3 See WAL H, cited

24

FoRDHAm
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the month and which is renewed by holding over for another definite term of
one month. Where the premises are occupied without a definite agreement as
to the length of the occupancy, the tenancy is almost universally thought of as
being indefinite as to term.
Although the concept of monthly tenancies, peculiar to the State of
New York only, is the source of much confusion, the nature of the
tenancy created by entry and payment of rent under a void parol
lease of more than a year has resulted in confusion worse confounded.
In the case of Adams v. City of Cohoes 2 6 the court's fatal
dicta 27 that the tenancy from month to month is analogous in all
respect to a tenancy from year to year and that in each case the
period of occupation is fixed so that there is no occasion for notice,
seems to be without merit. The doctrine laid down in the instant
case finds no support in like cases where there is an entry under 2a
void lease with rent reserved by the month. In Anderson v. Prindle, 8
the facts being substantially similar to those in the Adams case, it
was held that the subsequent acceptance of rent by the landlord in
accordance with the terms of the void agreement created a tenancy
from month to month with the tenant entitled to a month's notice
to quit at the end of some month from the commencement of the
tenancy. Yet in Talamo v. Spitzmiller,2 9 the court argued that the
entry under a parol lease for more than a year is ineffective to vest
any term in the lessee named and that when he goes into possession
without any further agreement, he is a tenant at will and merely
subject to liability to pay at the stipulated rent as for use and occupation. That this tenancy may be converted into a yearly, monthly,
year to year, or month to month tenancy, depends on the acts and
intention of the parties at the time of the entry. Acceptance of
the rent under the void lease by the landlord or some other unequivocal act results in a tenancy from year to year or month to
month as the case may be.3 0 The intent of the parties to hold for
a fixed period as manifested by the void lease is necessarily defeated.
In Laughran v. Smith 31 the court asserts that a contract declared
void under the Statute of Frauds cannot be enforced as one for a
fixed term consistent with the statute, and that neither does the
tenant desire to hold at will.
, The converse of this proposition would seem to be that in order
to characterize a tenancy arising under a void parol lease as one for
a year or a month certain, there need be some affirmative act such
as express words of limitation specifying that the duration of the
tenancy be for but one month or for one year. In the light of the
N. Y. 184 (1891).
WALSH, LAW OF REAL PROPERTY, cited supra note 5, at 259, n.7..
19 Wend. 391 (N. Y. 1838), aff'd, 23 Wend. 616 (N. Y. 1840); accord,
People v. Darling, cited supr; note 4.
29 120 N. Y. 37 (1890).
30 See WALSH, LAW OF REAL PROPERTY, cited supra note 5, at 260-261.
3175 N. Y. 205 (1878) ; c.f. Reeder v. Sayre, 70 N. Y. 180 (1877).
26127
27
28

See
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foregoing cases the logical rule to be formulated is that entry into
possession and payment under a void parol lease pursuant to the
monthly reservation contained therein, no other facts appearing,
creates a periodic tenancy from month to month within the scope of
Section 232b of the Real Property Law. As a monthly tenant is
within the scope of the statute, the next problem to be considered is
can the parties to the contractual letting agree to waive the benefits
thereof and can they by agreement stipulate for a shorter or longer
period of notification as the case may be? In an opinion recently
handed down by the Court of Appeals of the State of New York
in the case of Wood v. Horgan,3 2 involving Section 230 of the Real
Property Law, a waiver by the tenant of notice required under the
statute with regard to the automatic renewal clause, was held void
as against public policy. In other cases our courts have argued that
a tenant's contract with his landlord making the latter not responsible
for damages to the tenant because of the' landlord's failure to repair,
is valid and enforceable.38 Although the reason supporting this case
is not necessarily opposed to that of Wood v. Horgan, validity of
such clauses will probably only receive judicial sanction when they
are not of public concern and where the parties stand upon an equal
footing.34 In the absence of an express provision in the lease specifying the requisite notice, undoubtedly the statute will prevail. Where
the landlord and the tenant by clear and unequivocal language waive
statutory notification and stipulate for a longer or shorter period or
upon some other contingency, then their voluntary act in surrendering statutory benefits should not be condemned.
It was desirable that this statute be embodied into our Real
Property Law in order to remedy the chaotic condition that prevailed as to the character and length of notice required to terminate
monthly or month to month tenancies outside the City of New York.
The fact that the words of the statute are plain, and its meaning is
also plain, is a tribute to our legislature which we hope will receive
the support of our judiciary and not be dubbed as, pernicious oversimplification.
HELEN

32291 N. Y. 422, 427 (1943).
3 Kirschenbaum v. General Outdoor

34 Cited supra note 33.

COUNIHAN

WALTER.

Adv. Co., 258 N. Y. 489 (1932).

